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Introduction 
 
In December 2007, the Dutch Prime Minister, Jan-Peter Balkenende, returned to the Netherlands 
triumphant from the final negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty.
 1
 Less than two years earlier, in a 
referendum on 1 June 2005, the Dutch had dramatically rejected the draft Constitutional Treaty upon 
which the later Lisbon Treaty was largely based. At that time, Balkenende’s government had 
interpreted the referendum result to mean that the Dutch people were unsatisfied with the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Union (EU).
2
 His government had therefore made the increased role of 
national parliaments a Dutch priority during the Lisbon negotiations.
3
 On his return, Balkenende 
presented the addition of an ‘orange card’ in the Treaty of Lisbon as a great negotiating success for the 
Netherlands.
4
 His party linked the colour orange to the Dutch national colour and hoped that this 
would make the general public recognise themselves in Europe.
5
 One of the novelties of ‘Lisbon’ was 
the increased role of the national parliaments, meaning that if enough parliaments were dissatisfied 
with the subsidiarity of a new EU legislative proposal, they could now formally object to it. This 
‘early warning mechanism’ was part of Lisbon’s new role for national parliaments. 
The Dutch government reasoned that this increased role for national parliaments would help 
solve the discontent with European democracy that had, in their view, caused the negative referendum 
outcome.
6
 As State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Frans Timmermans – who was also involved in the 
negotiations – told the House of Representatives proudly, the President of the European Council, the 
President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament had all 
emphasized in their speeches that national parliaments in the EU would gain a new, strengthened role: 
“You can imagine that this put a smile on my face, because all three presidents were not really in 
favour of this when we were first committed to it.”7 With this statement, he demonstrated how 
ardently the Dutch government had pushed for a larger role for national parliaments in the EU, despite 
resistance from the heads of the European institutions. 
Thus, the prompt for writing this thesis was the negotiating position of the Netherlands during 
‘Lisbon’: the Netherlands had made the strengthening of national parliaments in the EU one of their 
five ‘red lines’.8 And yet while Balkenende himself reasoned that Dutch citizens had demonstrated 
                                                          
1
 Pieter de Wilde, ‘Why the early warning mechanism does not alleviate the democratic deficit’, OPAL Online 
Paper, Vol. 6, no. 12 (2012) p. 3. 
2
 Many scholars dispute this reasoning nowadays. (See e.g.: Aarts and Van der Kolk (2005); De Wilde (2012); 
Tans, Zoethout and Peters (2007).) 
3
 Leonard Besselink and Brecht van Mourik, ‘The Roles of the National Parliament and the European Parliament 
in EU Decision-Making: The Approval of the Lisbon Treaty in the Netherlands’, European Public Law, 2009, 
Vol.15(3), pp.307-3725. 
4
 ‘`Oranje kaart` van Nederland blijft kans maken’, NRC Handelsblad (2008). No author named. 
5
  Han ten Broeke, ‘Die Orangen Karte’, Trouw (2008).  
6
 Kees Aarts and Henk van der Kolk, ‘Understanding the Dutch “No”: The Euro, the East, and the Elite’, PS: 
Political Science & Politics, Vol. 39, no. 2 (2006) pp. 243-246. 
7
 Handelingen II, 2007/08, 31202, nr. 37, p. 2951.  
8
 Besselink and Van Mourik, ‘The Roles of the National Parliament and the European Parliament in EU 
Decision-Making’, p.307. 
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they were dissatisfied with the EU’s level of democratic legitimacy in the 2005 referendum, later 
research has shown that this had in fact not been the main reason for voting ‘no’. Contrary to the 
government’s reasoning, academics later stated that there had been a myriad of reasons why the Dutch 
people had voted against ratifying the Constitutional Treaty and that a common worry about the 
democratic state of the EU had not been the main one.
9
 Why, then, did the Balkenende administration 
focus on enhancing the role of national parliaments in the negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty? In so 
asking, this thesis does not adhere to Balkenende’s claim that the concern of the population with 
European democracy was the motivation for his government’s focus on national parliaments. Instead, 
this thesis argues that there were additional, less visible, institutional reasons for the focus.  
As we will see, these institutional reasons were at least twofold. Firstly, the Dutch House of 
Representatives (HoR) had been publicly debating their role within Europe for a long time; thus the 
scope of the debate about national parliaments within the EU clearly reached well before the 2005 
referendum. Parliaments have been interested in their role within the EU institutional setup since the 
early 1990s, when they were first recognized as institutional players on the European level.
10
 
Therefore, to find out why the Balkenende administration thought that enhancing the role of national 
parliaments would solve the Dutch people’s perceived discontent with democracy, this thesis looks 
beyond the immediate concern of the government of that time to the overarching discussion about the 
role of national parliaments and the democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
The second reason for asking why the Balkenende administration focused on the role of 
national parliaments, so this thesis will posit, is that the Dutch government had wanted to balance the 
EU’s decision-making process in favour of a more intergovernmental approach. The Dutch stance 
towards the EU has traditionally been very pragmatic, and has even been seen as changing to a more 
critical – but not sceptical – stance since the 1990s.11 The Dutch government wanted to balance the 
supranational tendencies of the European Parliament by focusing on national parliaments. During the 
Lisbon negotiations, Balkenende and Timmermans championed the expansion of an already existing 
informal practice that gave national parliaments the chance to object to EU legislative proposals, if 
they were considered contrary to the principle of subsidiarity.
12
 EU member states tried to reform the 
institutional structure of the EU since Maastricht so that it would better fit the enlargement that was 
coming up. The Dutch government wanted to enhance the role of national parliaments to increase 
practical importance of the principle of subsidiarity as a means to balance the EU institutions more to 
the benefit of member states instead of its supranational institutions.
13
 It would balance the recently 
                                                          
9
 Sara Binzer Hobolt and Sylvain Brouard, ‘Contesting the European Union? Why the Dutch and the French 
Rejected the European Constitution’, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 64, no. 2 (2011) pp. 309–322. 
10
 Christopher Lord, A Different Kind of Democracy? Debates About Democracy and the European Union 
(2015),  pp. 2-7.  
11
 Adriaan Schout and Jan Marinus Wiersma, ‘For as well as against: the Dutch-EU paradox. From pro-EU 
towards defending sovereignty?’, Clingendael Institute (2012) p. 3.  
12
 De Wilde, ‘Why the early warning mechanism does not alleviate the democratic deficit’, p. 3. 
13
 Ibidem. 
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adopted co-decision of the European Parliament, and at the same time still ensure proper democratic 
representation of the people at EU level. In this thesis, I will argue that this struggle with the EU’s 
institutional structure is an important reason why the Balkenende administration of 2007 decided to 
focus on enhancing the role of national parliaments in the EU.  
To answer the research question, this thesis will trace the debate in the Dutch House of 
Representatives about the role of national parliaments in the EU, and analyse how this small 
parliamentary discussion evolved; had consequences for the monitoring of EU legislation within the 
HoR; and how this debate ultimately influenced government policy. Thus, this thesis will bring to light 
how and most importantly why national parliaments became a priority for the Balkenende government 
in the negotiations for a new EU Treaty. Having stated the two mean reasons for asking this research 
question – the first being a justification corresponding with the research method, the second being a 
theory corresponding with the focus of the research – the main question has two elements that this 
research will address. The following paragraphs will state the two sub-questions of this thesis.  
First, since the debate about the European role for national parliaments had been longstanding: 
how did the debate about the role of national parliaments in the EU develop in the Dutch House of 
Representatives? To answer this first sub-question, this thesis looks at how the idea originated that 
national parliaments could provide more democratic legitimacy in the EU, and how this was first 
linked to the principle of subsidiarity. Equalling a larger role for national parliaments in the EU 
directly to more democratic legitimacy is too simply put, so how did this debate develop? Since 
subsidiarity was first officially enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht, the search for an answer to this 
question begins in 1992. Additionally, since the HoR had been interested in EU affairs since before 
2005, the yellow and orange card system was not the parliament’s first experience with EU affairs. 
The parliament had developed informal practices to gain more oversight and control on EU 
governance; the yellow and orange card system was in that sense a formalisation of an already existing 
practice. Thus, with this sub-question I want to trace how this debate developed in the HoR over time, 
and how the parliament assessed EU policy and which mechanisms it had to its disposal.  
Secondly, since the Balkenende administration struggled with the institutional set up of the 
EU, prior to Lisbon: what exactly did both parliament and government wish to solve by strengthening 
the role of national parliaments? In order to understand why the Dutch pushed for an increased role for 
national parliaments in the Lisbon negotiations, it is important to know the reasons for wanting to 
increase parliamentary oversight in general. Accepting the premise that the European democratic 
deficit was not the common worry of the Dutch people, and thus not the sole reason for the 
Balkenende-administration to focus on the role of national parliaments, eventually the question arises 
what parliamentarians and government hoped to achieve by a larger role for national parliaments. 
This thesis will answer these sub-questions by looking at the argumentation of MPs and 
singling out the institutional changes to both the HoR and the negotiating position of the Dutch 
government that were made because of these parliamentary debates. Combined, this will outline why 
6 
 
the Balkenende-government directed their energy towards the role of national parliaments in the 
Lisbon negotiations, by illuminating what parliament perceived to be wrong with their control over 
EU decision-making, and how, eventually, both parliament and government came to the conclusion 
that an enhanced role for national parliaments was the answer.  
To conclude the introduction, I will lay out how the thesis is structured. Chapter 1 will give 
academic context to the questions asked by means of a literature review. Chapter 2 will provide the 
research design and methodology. Chapters 3 to 7 are focused on the primary material, mostly minutes 
from parliamentary debates from 1992-2007, but information is also gathered from parliamentary 
briefs, policy documents and newspaper articles. The thesis is chronologically structured; Chapter 3 
starts in 1992, in the Dutch House of Representatives’ debate about the Maastricht Treaty, Chapter 4 
deals with the ratification debate of the Amsterdam Treaty, Chapter 5 with the debate surrounding the 
Treaty of Nice, Chapter 6 analyses the Convention on the Future of Europe and the resulting 
Constitutional Treaty and Chapter 7 finally deals with the aftermath of the 2005 referendum in the 
lead-up to the Lisbon Treaty. All parliamentary debates about Treaty revisions are analysed with a 
focus on the role of national parliaments in the EU. Every chapter will first sketch the state of affairs, 
and then answer the first sub-question in the first paragraph and the second in the second paragraph. 
The chapters will elaborate on relevant parliamentary debates, which are subsequently summarised 
and analysed. In the next and first chapter, however, the research question and sub-questions are first 
embedded in the broader secondary literature, and provided with academic context.  
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Chapter 1: Literature review 
 
Decision-making in the EU developed rapidly over the past 30 years, and national legislators 
sometimes seem to be scrambling to keep up. National parliaments have been struggling with their 
place in the European institutional framework ever since they were formally recognized in the EU 
institutional set-up. The Balkenende government of 2007 believed, like other member states, that an 
emphasised role for national parliaments could provide democratic control on European legislation. 
However, like Schout, Hoevenaars and Wiersma argue, the assumption that a stronger role for national 
parliaments would automatically provide the EU with more democratic legitimacy is too simplified.
14
 
For instance, some scholars ardently argue that national parliaments can help communicate to citizens 
and help bridge the democratic deficit that way,
15
 while other see them more as a tool to politicise the 
EU and thus enlarging democratic impact at home.
16
   
In the paragraphs below, I will discuss the main academic debates that substantiate this thesis. 
First, I will discuss what constitutes parliamentary control and how national parliaments in the EU try 
to achieve it. This embeds the first aspect of the research question, embodied by the first sub-question: 
‘How did the debate about the role of national parliaments in the EU develop in the HoR?’ Second, I 
will discuss the idea of European democratic legitimacy. This corresponds with the second sub-
question: ‘What exactly did both the Dutch House of Representatives and the Dutch government wish 
to solve by strengthening the role of national parliaments?’. This chapter will thus provide academic 
embedding for the questions of this thesis, and provide context for the following chapters.  
 
1.2 Parliamentary control  
With the expansion of the Union, both geographically and in competences, EU decision-making has 
gained importance in domestic political arenas. It is therefore important for national parliaments to 
exercise parliamentary control on European matters as much as on domestic matters. Tans, Zoethout 
and Peters define (political) control as ‘knowing about the object of control and being able to influence 
the object of control’.17 Being able to scrutinize EU affairs and policy proposals effectively therefore 
requires national parliaments to be properly informed and have some measure of influence, either by 
controlling their government official in the Council, or by gaining an independent role in the EU 
decision-making process.  
                                                          
14
 Adriaan Schout, Judith Hoevenaars and Jan Marinus Wiersma, ‘Obstacles to a strengthened role for national 
parliaments in the European Union’, Clingendael Institute (2014), p. 1. 
15
 Rosamaria Alibrandi, ‘Towards political integration in Europe: the involvement of national parliaments in 
European Union politics and policy-making’, Parliaments, Estates & Representation, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2018) pp. 
227–238. 
16
 Eric Miklin, ‘EU Politicisation and National Parliaments: Visibility of Choices and Better Aligned 
Ministers?’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 20, no. 1 (2014) pp. 78-92. 
17
 Olaf Tans, ‘The Dutch Parliament and the EU’ in: Tans, Zoehout and Peters, National Parliaments and 
European Democracy, pp. 166-167. 
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Naturally, the functioning of a national parliament differs very much per member state due to 
political culture, historical context and constitutional habits.
18
 Raunio and Wiberg write that the 
different levels of EU scrutiny over the member states’ national parliaments can be attributed to the 
role of parliament in the domestic setting and the way political parties and public opinion view EU 
issues.
19
 The Dutch parliament is an example of this, since the Dutch House of Representatives 
regulate the control of EU affairs mostly in an informal way.
20
 With regards to on which level 
parliaments try to exert influence, Cygan writes that national parliaments such as the United Kingdom 
and Scandinavian parliaments gave up on trying to influence the policy making process on EU level, 
and instead focused rather on holding their government representatives in the Council accountable.
21
 
The object of control therefore exists in their government officials in these cases, rather than directly 
in EU legislation.  
The Danish parliament is a well-known example of a national parliament with large control 
over its government executives in EU context. The Danish parliament has to give an explicit mandate 
to its government official, prior to any Council meeting, for the minister to be able to decide anything. 
In the early years of the European Union, this worked quite well, because decision-making was based 
on unanimity. However, since decision-making has changed in the EU, so had the way a national 
parliament can exert its influence on EU policy. The Danish EU Affairs Committee, which has before 
been a source of inspiration to other national parliaments that wanted to increase their control on EU 
legislation, does not seem able to persuade their parliament to adapt to this change in decision-
making.
22
  
After the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, legislators hoped that parliaments would focus on 
influencing EU affairs again rather than just their ministers in EU context. The loss of veto power in 
many policy fields in the Council had prompted this change of direction, and the new role for national 
parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty strengthened it. In areas where national interests are fundamentally at 
stake, but that are now decided on a supranational level such as the Common Security and Defense 
Policy, the added value of national parliaments could be significant.
23
 However, scholars agree that the 
national parliaments’ attainments of the Lisbon Treaty have only marginally strengthened the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU as a whole.
24
  
                                                          
18
 Tans, Zoehout and Peters, National Parliaments and European Democracy, p. 15. 
19
 Tapio Raunio, ‘The Finnish Eduskunta: Effective Scrutiny, Partisan Consensus’ in: Tans, Zoethout and Peters, 
National Parliaments and European Democracy, pp. 32-40. 
20
 Ibidem, p. 14. 
21
 Adam Cygan, ‘National parliaments within the EU polity – no longer losers but hardly victorious’, ERA 
Forum Vol. 12 (2012) p. 518. 
22
 Maja Møller Sousa, ‘Learning in Denmark? The Case of Danish Parliamentary Control over European Union 
Policy’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31, no. 4 (2008) pp. 428 – 429. 
23
 Jan Wouters and Kolja Raube, ‘Seeking CSDP Accountability Through Interparliamentary Scrutiny’, The 
International Spectator, Vol. 47, no. 4 (2012) p. 162. 
24
 Cygan, ‘National parliaments within the EU polity (2012)  p. 518. 
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The work of Tans, Zoethout and Peters has gone a long way in charting the many different 
approaches that member states take to scrutinizing and controlling EU affairs and their government 
representatives on EU level. They have not traced how the thoughts behind these mechanisms 
developed and how parliaments debated them, however. In this thesis, I will trace how the debate 
about national parliaments in the EU developed in the HoR, and explore how a government position is 
shaped by years of parliamentary debate and influential individuals. To know why a national 
parliament adapted to EU governance the way that it did, will provide a valuable insight in how 
parliaments react to institutional developments on EU level and how they can influence decision-
making bottom-up.  
 
1.2  Institutional functionality versus democratic legitimacy? 
Especially after the French and Dutch referenda on the draft Constitutional Treaty, the scholarly 
discussion about democracy in the EU reached new heights. For the purpose of this thesis, however, it 
is not relevant to dive into the academic discussion about the actual existence of a democratic deficit.
25
 
What is relevant to this thesis, however, is the premise that a larger role for national parliaments would 
automatically solve this democratic deficit. This argument returns often in both academic literature 
and parliamentary reasoning and links to the second sub-question of this thesis – what parliament and 
government actually wished to solve with a larger role for national parliaments in the EU. However, a 
larger role of national parliaments and more democratic legitimacy in the EU are not a direct cause 
and effect. Schout, Hoevenaars and Wiersma stretch this point as well, stating that it would be ‘too 
simplistic and unsubstantiated’ to assume that a larger role for national parliaments would 
automatically further the democratic legitimacy of the EU.
26
 The debate about the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy is more complicated than this.  
Put curtly, the EU’s democratic deficit is the result of the disparity between efficient majority 
voting in the Council and proper parliamentary oversight. The gradual transition to a qualified 
majority vote in the Council meant that member states had to forfeit their veto powers on many issues, 
which – although it made EU decision-making more efficient – created a democratic fallacy in their 
domestic structure of governance, because it made parliamentary oversight more difficult in national 
parliaments. Even though it is well-known that actual voting rarely take place in the Council
27
, 
abolishing the possibility of a veto made it easier for a government representative to ‘hide’ behind a 
majority in the Council.  
                                                          
25
 For an overview of the academic debate on the EU’s democratic deficit see e.g. Moravcsik (2002); Follesdal 
and Hix (2006); Moravcsik (2006); Kaina and Karolewski (2007). 
26
 Adriaan Schout, Judith Hoevenaars and Jan Marinus Wiersma, ‘Obstacles to a strengthened role for national 
parliaments in the European Union’, Clingendael Institute (2014) p.1. 
27
 Van Keulen, Going Europe or Going Dutch? (2006) p. 105. 
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And, as national parliaments experienced a lack of information, their jobs of scrutinizing their 
government’s position in the Council became even harder. It made national parliaments dependent on 
their governments for information, which per definition hinders proper parliamentary control. Both the 
possibility to hide behind other member states due to the loss of veto powers, and the information 
deficit in national parliaments undermined the possibilities for parliamentary oversight, and thus 
widened the democratic gap.
28
 With each step of EU integration, it grew more difficult for national 
parliaments to question and control their government representatives in the European Council. The 
Dutch constitutional system is largely based on ministerial responsibility, but the accountability of 
ministers in the Council was severely diminished because of the loss of veto power.
29
 As we will see 
in the following research chapters, the Dutch parliament has fought for more direct access to 
information about EU legislative proposals in the years 1992-2007.  
As a reaction to these democratic deficits, academics have observed two kinds of responses: 
those that want to strengthen the European Parliament and those that want to reinforce the national 
parliaments of the EU.
30 
Like the debate on the nature of the EU, this debate about the role of national 
parliaments can also be simplified to the federalist approach and the intergovernmental approach. The 
federalists generally want the European Parliament to be responsible for parliamentary oversight in the 
EU, and the intergovernmental approach often argues in favour of more power for national 
parliaments.
31
 The Dutch stance differs often, but can generally be described as pragmatic, Rood and 
Schouten state.
32
 In this thesis, this is confirmed as we see a decisive attitude change in the Dutch 
government from federal to intergovernmental. 
When looking at the polls about the referendum in 2005, it strikes that 6 months before the 
referendum, 73% of the Dutch population had expressed to Eurobarometer that they were in favour of 
a Constitutional Treaty. However, at the referendum on June 1 2005, 61% voted against.
33
 Atican 
argues that an especially strong campaign against the Constitutional Treaty was the main reason for 
the unexpected outcome. The ‘no’ campaign successfully linked topics such as Turkish accession to 
the EU and the loss of sovereignty over national affairs to the Constitutional Treaty. Democracy also 
played a big role in the ‘no’ campaign, with the biggest argument being that there is no European 
‘demos’ and thus no possibility for a real European democracy. However, although this argument 
played a big role in the campaign, and was subsequently indicated by politicians in their first 
responses as being one of the main reasons for the ‘no’ vote, voters themselves did not cite this 
                                                          
28
 Cygan, ‘National parliaments within the EU polity’ (2012) p. 520. 
29
 Tans, Zoethout and Peters, National Parliaments and European Democracy, p. 177. 
30
 Sverker Gustavsson, ‘Preserve or Abolish the Democratic Deficit?’ in: Eivind Smith, National Parliaments as 
Cornerstones of European Integration (1996) p. 100-101. 
31
 Tapio Raunio, ‘Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union’, Government and 
Opposition, vol. 34, no. 2 (1999) p. 181/. 
32
 Rood, J. and Schout, A., The Netherlands As an EU Member : Awkward or Loyal Partner? (2013). 
33
 Ece Ozlem Atikcan, ‘Framing’ the European Union: Explaining the 2005 Constitutional Referenda Results 
(2010) p. 192. 
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argument as being particularly important.
34
 In fact, in a Eurobarometer review only 5% of voters gave 
the reason ‘the EU is not democratic enough’ as explanation for their vote.35 Hobolt and Brouard 
confirm this, as concern about democracy in the EU did not emerge in their research as an important 
factor for voting ‘no’ in the referendum.36 Thus the general opinion of the academic world – after 
researching the 2005 referendum outcome – is that democratic legitimacy did not play a decisive part 
in people’s decision to vote against the Constitutional Treaty. However, just after the referendum 
politicians often cited this reason as having been important.
 37
 
This thesis concurs with the general academic opinion, and disputes that the worry for 
democratic legitimacy was the only reason for the Balkenende administration to adopt this position in 
the Lisbon negotiations. Nevertheless, since most politicians did reason from that point of view, the 
second part of this chapter has embedded the second sub-question in the larger debate about 
democratic legitimacy, and thus showed why it is relevant to revisit the question why the Balkenende 
administration focused on national parliaments in the Lisbon negotiations. The next chapter will 
provide the methodology and design for answering this question. 
                                                          
34
 Arjen Nijeboer, ‘The Dutch Referendum’, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol.1, no. 3 (2005) p. 404. 
35
 Nijeboer, ‘The Dutch Referendum’ (2005) p. 401. 
36
 Hobolt and Brouard, ‘Contesting the European Union? (2011) pp. 309–322. 
37
 Nijeboer, ‘The Dutch Referendum’ (2005) p. 404. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology and research design  
 
This thesis will explain why the Netherlands focused on the role of national parliaments during the 
Lisbon negotiations, by tracing the Dutch parliamentary debates about the role of national parliaments 
in the EU. Answering this research question will shed light on the decision-making process in Dutch 
governance, the inner workings of the Dutch House of Representatives and the interplay between 
parliament and government in The Netherlands. To answer why the Balkenende administration 
focused on enhancing the role of national parliaments in the EU in the Lisbon negotiations, I will use 
systematic process tracing, by means of historical analysis. The position of the Dutch government in 
the Lisbon negotiations in 2007 is the dependent output variable. The thesis will provide an 
explanation for this position using primarily minutes and reports from parliamentary ratification 
debates in the period 1992-2007. Since the Dutch parliament has the power to control and question 
government officials and positions, these minutes will show the interplay between parliament and 
government on this topic, and thus how the government position in 2007 was shaped. This thesis uses 
the Dutch case-study as a standalone case that is relevant for wider research to European parliaments, 
the role of national parliaments within the EU and the debate about the EU’s democratic legitimacy. 
The next two paragraphs will provide context for the empirical chapters that follow after. 
 
2.1 The Dutch House of Representatives 
Since this thesis uses the Dutch House of Representatives as a case study, understanding how 
this chamber works in the grander scheme of the role of national parliaments in the EU is vital. The 
HoR has made its EU-related decisions through the use of a permanent EU Affairs committee, which 
is also the first point of contact for inter-parliamentary cooperation. Next to this, the committee 
informs and advises the HoR about relevant European developments in other policy fields. The Dutch 
House of Representatives was a relative latecomer to the practice of monitoring EU affairs, however: 
its EU affairs committee was only established in 1986.
38
 This committee is also active in COSAC, the 
Conference of the European Affairs Committees, an international cooperation platform for national 
parliaments’ EU affairs committees and EU parliament delegations. It meets twice a year to exchange 
information, ideas and best practices and was first held in 1989. 
Despite– or perhaps because of– this, the Dutch House of Representatives was an early 
adapter to the idea of parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislative proposals on the basis of subsidiarity, 
and had a protocol in place for the active scrutiny of EU affairs as early as 2006.
39
 However, its active 
                                                          
38
 Van Keulen, Going Europe or Going Dutch? (2006) p. 105. 
39
 Van den Brink, T., ‘The Substance of Subsidiarity: The Interpretation and Meaning of the Principle after 
Lisbon’, in: Trybus, M., and Rubini, M., The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy 
(2012)  p. 2. 
13 
 
approach to this mechanism is in stark contrast with the image that Van Keulen paints on the Dutch 
parliaments’ involvement in EU affairs in general. Officially, a summary of EU legislative proposals is 
sent to the parliament – the so-called ‘BNC-fiches’40 – before any negotiations, and parliament can 
technically question government officials about them. The fiches are written by an interdepartmental 
working group, spearheaded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and contain brief summaries of 
legislative proposals, since 2007 they also contain an evaluation of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
of the proposal. Fiches also contain the preliminary position of the Netherlands on a EU legislative 
proposal. 
In the case of a Justice and Home Affairs Council of Ministers meeting, however, the 
parliament has explicit mandatory powers to be informed by the minister beforehand. Active use of 
this power does not occur often, however, in comparison to the Danish case for instance.
41
 The reasons 
for a relatively passive attitude are well-known: lack of knowledge of EU dossiers, pressure of 
domestic issues, lack of salience of EU matters and the limited timeframe in which these 
developments usually take place. Active debate is usually limited to a few specialized members of 
parliament (MPs) and salient topics like Treaty revisions or the Dutch contribution to the EU Multi-
annual Financial Framework.
 42
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Chapter 3: The Treaty of Maastricht 
 
This thesis starts its empirical research at the parliamentary debate on the Maastricht Treaty, since the 
idea of a role for national parliaments in European decision-making was first formally introduced 
there. The Maastricht Treaty encompassed a ‘Declaration concerning the role of the national 
parliaments in the European Union’, in which the Member States emphasized their vision of a bigger 
role for national parliaments. These protocols highlighted the importance of information and best 
practice exchanges between national parliaments within COSAC, and directly between national 
parliaments and the European Parliament. This particular protocol also asked of governments to 
inform their national parliaments on time about upcoming legislative proposals or other important 
affairs, so MPs could scrutinize EU proposals and their governments. Already, since 1989, the Dutch 
government had a system in place to inform the HoR and Senate about new Commission proposals 
through the abovementioned ‘fiches procedure’. However, because of ministerial bureaucracy this 
procedure was often late and it effectively provided the government with an information-monopoly 
which put the parliament in a dependent position.
43
  
Additionally, although the principle of subsidiarity was officially enshrined in the EU’s 
institutional set-up in the Maastricht Treaty, there was not yet any mention of the role of national 
parliaments in this regard.
44
 Mainly, the debate about the Maastricht Treaty in the HoR was interesting 
because of two particular aspects of the parliamentary discussion during the ratification period of this 
treaty: the amount of parliamentary discussion on the treaty, and a renewed attention to the democratic 
deficit caused by a lack of information about EU affairs in the Dutch parliament.  
 
3.1 The Maastricht negotiations debated  
The debate about the Maastricht Treaty in the Dutch House of Representatives is particularly relevant 
in the light of the development of the debate about the role of national parliaments in the EU in the 
Dutch HoR, which is the first sub-question of this thesis. The Treaty of Maastricht was not much 
debated in the Dutch House of Representatives before its signing but started to show interest in their 
own role in European decision-making from this period onwards. The parliament did not monitor 
European affairs as intensely during the Maastricht ratification-process yet as they did five years later 
at the ‘Amsterdam’ negotiations: its permanent EU affairs committee was still ‘young’ – having been 
established in 1986 – and most parliamentarians were simply not that interested in EU affairs.45 They 
initially saw their role of keeping parliamentary oversight on EU legislation as a temporary one, 
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waiting for the EP to grow its mandate.
46
 That debating and ratifying of the Treaty of Maastricht was 
not a high priority for the HoR is illustrated by a letter from the state secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
reprimanding the House for taking too long to schedule the ratification-debate.
47
 The Dutch 
parliament’s own perception of their role slowly shifted only after the failure of the non-paper on a 
European political union that the Dutch government had proposed during its presidency in 1991, 
leading up to Maastricht. Both parliament and government realised then that an EU with federal traits 
– something that the Dutch government of 1991 was in favour of – was not politically feasible in the 
other member states and did not have the support of the Dutch people.
48
 This incident stimulated a 
slow increase in parliamentary interest in EU affairs: in 1997, during the debate on the Amsterdam 
Treaty in the Dutch House of Representatives, Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Mierlo expressed that 
he thought it to be a victory that the HoR was more inclined to debate the content of the new Treaty 
than they had been five years before. It meant that European affairs were on their radar, as they had 
not been during the negotiations for ‘Maastricht’.49 
 
3.2 The Danish ‘no’ 
The pro-integrationist stance of the Dutch government and parliament in 1992 was tempered by the 
more moderate reactions to the Treaty in other member states. The Danish ‘no’ to Maastricht 
resonated with the Dutch parliament, and most parties in the HoR agreed that the Maastricht Treaty 
was not the final stage of optimizing the institutional set-up of the EU. MP Van der Linden (CDA) 
ultimately summarized the result of the Danish referendum in threefold: “Firstly, it has become clear 
that the European Community should confine itself to what is strictly necessary. […] Secondly, I 
believe that the referendum has once again urged politicians to emphasize the need to strengthen 
democratic control. To which I add: including the role of national parliaments. [..] And thirdly, the gap 
between politicians and citizens has now been demonstrated.”50 In this statement, he linked the results 
of the Danish referendum to the strict division of competences between EU and member states, 
subsequently to democratic control and the role of national parliaments and finally to the gap between 
citizens and politicians. This shows the idea behind the reasoning that national parliaments might play 
a role in solving the democratic deficit, and is the prelude for an answer to the second sub-question of 
this thesis – what exactly did both government and parliament wish to solve by strengthening the role 
of national parliaments in the EU? The Dutch government and parliament had misjudged the 
enthusiasm for a more federal Europe both internationally as well as nationally, and thus concluded 
that they had lost touch with their citizens. However, the French voted in favour of the Treaty – 
                                                          
46
 Hilde Reiding and Afke Groen, ‘Kaartspel om de macht’, Internationale Spectator, Vol. 8, no. 69 (2015) p. 2. 
47
 Kamerstukken II, 1991/92, 21952, nr. 38. 
48
 Reiding and Groen, ‘Kaartspel om de macht’ (2015) p. 3. 
49
 Handelingen II, 1996/97, 24609, nr. 82, p. 5693. 
50
 Ibidem, p. 5693. 
16 
 
although barely – with a small majority of 51%. This petit oui gave the impression that a ‘permissive 
consensus’ existed on the path that EU integration was on.51  
The discussion about the democratic deficit in the EU became increasingly relevant in the 
HoR in 1992 for two reasons. First, the Danish had held a referendum on the ratification of Treaty of 
Maastricht, and the Danish people had voted ‘no’. Moreover, MP Van Middelkoop 
(GPV/ChristenUnie) argued that almost 60% of the Dutch people would want a referendum on the 
treaty as well. He stated that the democratic deficit of the European project has now been revealed and 
asks the government to comment on the apparent lack of political legitimacy of this treaty.
52
 MP 
Eisma (D66) affirmed, in reaction to MP Van Middelkoops statements, that the result of the Danish 
referendum was linked to the democratic issue. “This is not just about the formal democratic deficit in 
Europe and the limited powers of the European Parliament […]. We also see a large gap between 
citizens and national politics.”53 This is the second reason why the parliamentary discussion about the 
democratic deficit was increasingly relevant. Democratic legitimacy was already a particularly 
relevant topic in that parliamentary year, because the HoR had recently appointed a committee to 
research the gap between the political elite and the Dutch people.
54
 The findings of this committee 
notwithstanding, the fact that it was appointed for this specific question illustrates that democratic was 
very much part of the zeitgeist: the discussion about democratic legitimacy was on the minds of the 
MPs. 
Therefore, both the general lack of parliamentary debate about the Maastricht Treaty in 
comparison to later treaties and the increased discussion about the European democratic deficit 
contributed to the first mention of the role of national parliaments in the EU in 1992. Despite the lack 
of general debate by the HoR, there had up until now always been a few MPs that did show interest in 
EU affairs. One amendment to the domestic ratification act especially cleared the way for a bigger 
parliamentary influence in the EU. The HoR regained some power on their government representatives 
in the EU, by adopting an amendment from MP Van der Linden (CDA) into the ratification act of the 
Dutch parliament.
 55
 This meant that for government officials to be able to accept binding decisions in 
the ‘third pillar’, they had to be subjected to parliamentary consent, if co-decision did not apply. 
Similar amendments in earlier treaties had ensured that parliamentary consent was also necessary for 
other binding decisions in the fields of justice and home affairs, concerning the free movement of 
persons and the Schengen Agreement.
56
 Linking back to the first sub-question on the development of 
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this debate in the HoR, this signalled that – despite the lack of more general interest – some MPs were 
trying to preserve parliamentary control on decisions that were of importance in the domestic political 
arena, and trying to balance the lacking co-decision procedure if necessary.  
 
As we have seen in this chapter, the Dutch parliament slowly started to shift their perception of their 
own role in the EU, as a result of a less pro-integrationist international reception of their non-paper 
than expected and a meagre reception by the Dutch public. Under this pressure, they started to give 
more attention to the legitimacy of politics in general. The Maastricht Treaty’s institutional reforms, 
controversies surrounding the EMU and the failed Dutch non-paper revealed a perceived democratic 
deficit on a European level to the Dutch parliament and so the Dutch House of Representatives urged 
the Dutch government to consider this debate when negotiating the revisions to the Treaty at the IGC 
in Amsterdam in 1997. This chapter has shown that the debate about the role of national parliaments in 
the EU traces back to far before the Dutch ‘no’ vote in the referendum on the draft Constitutional 
Treaty and illustrates that the Dutch House of Representatives started to show interest in their own role 
from the early 1990s onwards. In the next chapter, concerning the parliamentary debates about the 
Amsterdam Treaty, we will see the concept of subsidiarity being linked to national parliaments for the 
first time. 
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Chapter 4: The Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
During the parliamentary year of 1996-1997, the negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty were in full 
development. The HoR engaged with the Dutch government in multiple plenary debates, to query the 
government on the Dutch official position during these negotiations, as they had stipulated in the Van 
der Linden-amendment during the ratification of ‘Maastricht’. The member states had negotiated for 
almost two years, and an ‘outline for a draft treaty revision’ was on the table.57 The Netherlands had a 
difficult double-role to play as both negotiator and chair during the IGC in Amsterdam. Large agenda 
items were the EMU and the foreign policy of the EU, naturally, but the biggest challenge for the 
functioning of the EU’s institutions was the necessary change in decision-making. A different 
weighing of votes in the Council was needed, and the European Parliament was to gain co-decision in 
multiple policy areas. However, these issues were not decided in the Treaty of Amsterdam, but largely 
postponed to the Treaty of Nice. But this democratic dilemma spurred a debate in the Dutch House of 
Representatives during the negotiations in Amsterdam. The risk existed that a form of majority voting 
was to be introduced in the Council, in policy areas where co-decision was not extended to the 
Parliament, thus creating a lack of democratic legitimacy. Dutch political parties were divided on the 
issue: D66, as a more federally oriented party was prone to favour an extension of the co-decision to 
the European Parliament, whereas the more intergovernmental oriented political parties, e.g. 
GPV/ChristenUnie and VVD, were arguing for an emphasised role for national parliaments. 
Simplified, this divide came down to the federalist/intergovernmentalist discussion as introduced in 
the literature review section of this thesis. 
 
4.1 Intergovernmental versus federal approach 
When looking at the first sub-question about the development of the debate in the HoR about the role 
of national parliaments in the EU, the federalist/intergovernmentalist debate is highly relevant. In the 
plenary debate of 21 May 1997, the HoR reacted to a letter sent by the Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Van Mierlo in March that year. In this letter, Van Mierlo briefed the HoR on the upcoming 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Amsterdam and where the negotiations stood at that moment. 
He described widespread support amongst member states to enclose a ‘subsidiarity-protocol’, one of 
the Dutch priorities, that would define the principle of subsidiarity for the first time.
58
 However, 
member states had not yet been able to agree on its content regarding a subsidiarity-test. Some 
member states wanted a role for the Committee of the Regions, COSAC, or the European Parliament 
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and others (i.a. The Netherlands) wanted a larger role for national parliaments.
59
 The inclusion of this 
last option illustrates that the discussion about the role of national parliaments was now not only 
firmly established in the debate about democracy in the EU, it was also for the first time linked to 
subsidiarity. In his letter to the House, the minister clearly stated that the Netherlands was amongst 
those member states that were in favour of an extended role for national parliaments, where co-
decision was not applied. This shows the inclination of the Dutch government towards an 
intergovernmental solution, the fact that the government was headed by a coalition where two of the 
three parties, D66 and PvdA, were prone to federal solutions. The voice of intergovernmentalist state 
secretary for European Affairs Patijn (VVD) was a big influence here and shifted the policy away 
from the federal approach of 1991/92, towards a more intergovernmental stance. 
 
4.2 Information for the House 
Regarding the second sub-question of this thesis, about what both government and parliament wished 
to solve by strengthening the role of national parliaments; during the debates about ‘Amsterdam’ the 
HoR focused on its own information position for the first time. ‘Maastricht’ had made the parliament 
more aware of their own role in Europe, and during these debates about ‘Amsterdam’, the HoR started 
to look at what they needed from the EU for a better grasp on its legislative proposals, instead of 
focusing on how to control their own government officials. This was concretised in a motion about the 
information position of national parliaments by MP Van Middelkoop (GPV/ChristenUnie), in which 
he argued in favour of an enhanced role for national parliaments. He pointed out that the government 
had promised in Van Mierlo’s letter and in earlier statements to the House that national parliaments 
would gain a more prominent role in the Dutch negotiating position, but that this was missing from the 
official communications so far. He worried that the democratic deficit would grow when voting ratios 
in the Council were adapted and parliamentary control was not guaranteed. Several other parties, i.e. 
coalition party VVD, but also the CDA and SGP, supported this assertion. He therefore submitted a 
motion to parliament where he urged the Dutch government to consider proper information provisions 
for national parliaments, and to ensure a period of at least four weeks to scrutinise all EU proposals 
that could be relevant to the legislative process.
60
 The fact that this motion was accepted with 
unanimous support from all parliamentary groups signalled that it was not a party political issue: 
everyone agreed that the EU needed to improve its parliamentary oversight.
61
 The Dutch government 
adopted this idea in their official communications to the HoR, and promised to negotiate in favour of 
the proposal. The idea for the proposal was first formulated in the COSAC-conclusions of the October 
1996 conference. Even though parliaments did not have an official role in the Amsterdam 
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negotiations, they were actively trying to put the issue on the agenda through international 
cooperation.
62
  
The Amsterdam Treaty thus carried a ‘protocol on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union’, which stressed that national parliaments should be properly informed by their 
governments in order to ensure parliamentary oversight on government officials, as well as on EU 
legislative proposals. A new feature was the period of six weeks before an EU legislative proposal was 
discussed in the Council, in which all documents had to be provided to the respective parliaments. The 
six week period indicated that COSAC cooperation had been successful: national parliaments even 
gained two weeks extra time on the motion that Van Middelkoop had issued. These points were added 
to the Amsterdam Treaty in a protocol rather than a recommendation, that had been the case in the 
Maastricht Treaty. Since protocols are legally binding and recommendations are not, this was a 
definite improvement.
63
 However, both measures – more information provisions and the six-week 
period – were aimed at strengthening the parliaments in parliamentary oversight of their own 
government officials at EU level. Although this was an important part of the debate on the EU’s 
democratic deficit as well, it did not allow national parliaments direct influence on EU decision-
making. Thus, while the protocol did address the worry on which the COSAC/Van Middelkoop 
motion was based, it did not intrinsically enhance democratic legitimacy of the EU legislative process 
or improve oversight on EU institutions. Neither did the provision work flawlessly; national 
parliaments were in practice still mostly dependent on their government officials for the right 
information nor were communications from the Commission about upcoming legislative proposals 
consistent.
64
 
Additionally, in the second part of the protocol – which deals with the role of COSAC – the 
text suggests that COSAC might scrutinise EU legislative proposals. According to the protocol, 
COSAC may address comments on legislative proposals to any EU institution, ‘especially concerning 
the principle of subsidiarity’.65 In the first place, this gives the cooperation of national parliaments in 
the EU the legal right to have an opinion on EU legislation, which was a big step towards a defined 
role for national parliaments. Secondly, by mentioning the principle of subsidiarity explicitly in 
relation to COSAC, the Amsterdam protocol paved the way for the inclusion of subsidiarity in the role 
of national parliaments. This proved to be a stepping-stone for the HoR in the debates surrounding the 
much-needed treaty revisions during the IGC in Nice in 2002. 
As we have seen in this chapter, the call for a larger role for national parliaments in the EU was 
supported by intergovernmentalist parties as well as the government in 1997, despite the fact that the 
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government’s coalition parties were traditionally more federal oriented. This is a change from the 
approach we saw during the ‘Maastricht’ negotiations from both the government and the HoR. After 
the failure of the Dutch non-paper in 1991 and the bad reception, both internationally and by the Dutch 
public, the government switched to a more intergovernmental stance.
66
 The HoR became increasingly 
more aware of their role in the scrutiny of EU legislation, and gained important tools to potentially 
increase their parliamentary oversight on EU legislation with the new information provisions and the 6 
weeks period to respond to EU legislative proposals the parliament. In the next chapter, we will see an 
increase in this newfound awareness of the role of national parliaments in the EU and an even more 
active call for the operationalisation of the subsidiarity principle. 
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Chapter 5: The Treaty of Nice 
 
The Nice IGC of 2001 needed to solve many institutional difficulties that the member states had not 
been able to solve during prior negotiations. An adjustment to the voting ratios in the Council was 
necessary because of the upcoming growth of the EU, for instance. During the negotiations leading up 
to the IGC in Nice in December 2000, the government kept the HoR duly informed. Notable in the 
updates from minister of Foreign Affairs Van Aartsen, however, is that the updates rarely mention the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU, while that issue was still high on the agenda of parliament. The 
member states’ biggest concern during ‘Nice’ was the institutional set up of the EU; more specifically 
voting ratios and qualified majority voting in the Council, which had to be prepared for the upcoming 
enlargements.
67
 A ‘post-Nice agenda’ was composed, which put ‘a more precise divide of the 
competencies between the Union and the Member States and the role of national parliaments’ on the 
agenda for the next IGC in 2004.
68
 The accords of the Nice summit were direly needed for the 
institutional set up of a growing Union, and put the more ideological question of democratic 
legitimacy on the long-term agenda: efficient functioning was at the moment more important than the 
question of legitimacy.  
 
5.1 “Trust is good, control is better” 
With regards to the development of the debate about the role of national parliaments in EU decision-
making – the first sub-question – it can be argued that the Nice IGC was a step back. In December 
2000, the Dutch House of Representatives debated the draft treaty. MPs Timmermans (PvdA – later 
state secretary for European Affairs and minister of Foreign Affairs) and Scheltema-De Nie (D66), 
both from very pro-European parties and governing parties, were urging Prime Minister Kok (PvdA) 
to take action on the role of national parliaments in the European institutional architecture. Kok was 
forced to admit that the Dutch position on this subject was not entirely clear yet, and that it would be a 
conjoint process with the House to formulate their position on this subject.
69
 This statement shows that 
the role of national parliaments was not on the radar of the government at the time of the ‘Nice’ 
negotiations, even if it was on the agenda of the HoR. The parliament took matters into their own 
hands: in June 2001, before the parliamentary ratification of the Nice Treaty, multiple MPs spoke out 
on increasing domestic control on European affairs. Up until then, in case of EU legislative proposals, 
government informed the parliament’s permanent committee on European Affairs. In turn, they would 
provide other committees with the necessary information. As domestic issues were increasingly 
influenced by a European dimension, however, the HoR wanted to get a firmer grip on the European 
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dimension of domestic policy issues.
70
 The chair of the HoR set out an inquiry at the permanent 
committee on European Affairs, which appointed MP Van Baalen (VVD) to research the possibilities 
of strengthening democratic control and influence of the Dutch parliaments on European decision-
making.
 71
 
Van Baalen submitted his report – ‘On time is too late’ – to the HoR in 2002.72 In this report, 
he signalled two developments in European decision-making. Firstly, he stated that national 
parliaments were supposed to hold their governments accountable, when the heads of state or 
ministers negotiate on the European level. However, he argued that this is where the democratic deficit 
lies, since it is difficult for national parliaments to exercise effective control on their government 
officials when they go to Brussels, due to a lack of information and a shift to qualified majority voting 
in the Council. The Council meetings are not transparent, and both before and after such meetings 
parliamentary control is almost a formality. He wrote: “[…] the House must for a large part rely on its 
trust in the government. Trust is good, however, control is better.”73 This clearly reflected the 
sentiment that was growing in the HoR: the Dutch parliament should know what developments are 
going on in Brussels, since such developments potentially have a large impact on Dutch domestic 
policy. This is a change in how the HoR saw their own role: in 1992 they still saw themselves as 
temporarily involved in EU affairs while waiting on a stronger European Parliament, but now the 
parliament started to realise that they needed more information on EU affairs in order to maintain 
parliamentary oversight on domestic affairs.  
Van Baalen ultimately concluded that national parliaments in general should be more active in 
their European network and especially within their formal mandates on intergovernmental issues, to 
diminish the democratic deficit.
74
 After the Van Baalen report, the Dutch parliaments installed a 
Permanent Representative in Brussels – despite qualms about high costs – to ensure their independent 
information position. It is clear here, that the HoR took on a more active stance on the position of 
national parliaments in the EU than the Dutch government. 
 
5.2 Efficiency versus democracy 
During the evaluation of the Nice Treaty in parliament, just after the negotiations concluded and 
before its ratification, the sentiment amongst the MPs was that ‘Nice’ did not provide a consistent 
solution to the democratic legitimacy question. Again, and this time more pronounced than in 1997, 
the MPs felt that democratic gaps fell where qualified majority voting was introduced. National 
parliaments were not even on the agenda in Nice, although Dutch MPs had already in 1997 suggested 
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that they might provide a democratic safety net for the European institutions. The more ‘federalist’ 
oriented parties, like D66, stuck to the idea of co-decision for the EP with every instance of qualified 
majority voting, whilst the traditionally intergovernmental oriented parties (e.g. CDA, VVD and 
GPV/ChristenUnie) argued for a role for national parliaments.
75
 In a report drafted by the permanent 
committee on European Affairs, submitted to the HoR before ratification in September 2001, members 
of D66 were said to be ‘regretting the fact that the democratic deficit, which fell after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, was not fixed.’76 In some cases, the European Parliament’s right to consent with 
legislation even disappeared in this Treaty, while the decision-making of a policy area was changed to 
qualified majority in the Council. According to academics, this is where the discussion about the EU’s 
democratic deficit originates: a Union with increasingly federal characteristics, but without any of the 
usual safeguards of a federal state.
77
 Theoretically, this only worsened the democratic state of the EU. 
MPs wondered ‘if they should deduce from this, that the government also considers the right of 
consent from its own parliaments to be without value’.78 The implied insult of this GroenLinks MP to 
the government – that the government disrespected the democratic control that a parliament could 
provide – illustrated the worry and anger of some parliamentarians about the lack of democratic 
control on EU decisions. It showed that parliament felt that they lost control over the decision-making 
process, and could not guarantee proper parliamentary oversight on the European level. This illustrates 
clearly what this thesis has argued in previous chapters: up until ‘Amsterdam’, the parliament was 
mostly occupied with the question of how to best control their own government officials in the EU. 
Now, however, it started to look beyond that, and to focus more on the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU, linking back to the second sub-question about what exactly government and parliament wanted to 
solve by enhancing the role of national parliaments in the EU. Some parties, e.g. GPV/ChristenUnie 
even went so far as to plead for a subsidiarity test for national parliaments with testable criteria for the 
Court of Justice. 
Due to the enlargement looming over the Nice IGC, ‘efficiency’ had got the upper hand on 
‘democracy’. Since the IGC in Nice had also not been able to set the rule that majority voting in the 
Council would always be accompanied by co-decision from the European Parliament, it was clear that 
the subject of democratic legitimacy through parliamentary oversight was postponed until the next 
IGC in 2004. MPs spoke of a ‘hostile atmosphere’ between the large and the smaller member states 
during the Nice negotiations, and of a failing of the Community method of decision-making through 
IGC’s. Domestic and international press featured stories of a ‘mess in Nice’, and MP Karimi 
(GroenLinks) spoke about the ‘monstrosity of Nice’.79 In the end, however, the Dutch House of 
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Representatives ratified the Treaty because they argued that the proposed institutional reforms were 
necessary for the sake of the upcoming enlargement, but they were not fully satisfied with the 
outcome. Despite MPs Timmermans (PvdA) and Scheltema-De Nie (D66) specifically urging the 
Minister to take action on the role of national parliaments, the subject was clearly not on the agenda of 
the government during ‘Nice’. The European Council established the European Convention on the 
Future of Europe in December 2001, by means of the Laeken Declaration. This declaration named the 
role of national parliaments as one of the most important issues to be considered for future treaty 
reforms, because of its potential to bridge the democratic gap between EU institutions and its 
citizens.
80
 
 
With regards to the first sub-question on the development of the debate on national parliaments during 
‘Nice’, we have seen in this chapter that the Dutch House of Representatives stressed the importance 
of national parliamentary oversight, urging the government to take the role of national parliaments into 
account as a possible solution to the democratic legitimacy problem of the EU. Additionally, the Van 
Baalen report showed that the impact of European legislation on domestic policy meant that the HoR 
had to become more actively involved by actively pursuing their own sources of information and 
international cooperation. National parliaments simply had no other option if they wanted to stay 
ahead of European developments. Furthermore, regarding the second sub-question, the House clearly 
wanted to see an operationalisation of the subsidiarity-principle – that was introduced as a basis for the 
COSAC competence of commenting on legislative proposals from the Commission in the protocol on 
the role of national parliaments attached to the Amsterdam Treaty. Additionally, this chapter 
illustrated the increased focus on the democratic legitimacy that MPs believed a larger role for 
national parliaments in the EU could bring. The next chapter will discuss the debates about the 
Convention on the Future of Europe – following the Laeken Declaration – and the resulting draft 
Constitutional Treaty.   
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Chapter 6: The Convention and the Constitution  
 
The Convention on the Future of Europe started crafting the draft Constitutional Treaty in the 
beginning of 2002. Between 2002 and July 2003, multiple drafts were created and thousands of 
amendments were submitted to the negotiations. The European Convention was a think-tank, 
comprised of representatives from the governments and parliaments of all EU Member States, as well 
as representatives from the European Commission and the European Parliament. The Convention was 
without precedent, and as such piqued the attention from both the Dutch House of Representatives as 
well as the Senate. Already at the ratification debate of the Nice Treaty, it had been clear that the 
member states’ work on reforming the EU was not done yet. The most urgent changes had been 
facilitated, but many of the planned institutional reforms had been postponed. The purpose of the 
Convention was to create a draft European Constitution, which it did in July 2003.
81
  
 
6.1 Usual suspects and joint debates 
It was the first time that representatives of national parliaments were invited to help revise a treaty. It 
was in fact the first time that parliaments officially had any influence on EU decision-making at all.
82
 
Two representatives from the Dutch parliaments MP Timmermans (PvdA), from the HoR, and MP 
Van der Linden (CDA), this time representing the Senate, attended the Convention. These names have 
appeared in this thesis before, since MP Timmermans had urged the government in 2001 to negotiate 
in favour of stronger national parliaments in the negotiations of the Nice Treaty, and would later 
become state secretary for European Affairs during the negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty. MP Van 
der Linden had submitted the amendment with which the HoR gained the power to better control the 
positions of their government officials in the Council after ‘Maastricht’. These were both MP’s that 
had focused on this debate since the beginning of their time as parliamentarians. With regards to the 
first sub-question –  how did the debate about the role of national parliaments develop in the HoR – 
we see that it is again the ‘usual suspects’ driving the debate forward. 
Another novelty in the development of the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU 
were the joint debates. Since both Dutch parliamentary chambers were represented in the Convention, 
they organised joint parliamentary meetings in June 2003, to debate the Convention and to query the 
government on its views. These debates were a novelty, because joint parliamentary meetings were 
usually only held in case of the Netherlands declaring war, or approval of a royal marriage.
83
 During 
these debates, MPs were focused on two main topics. MP Van der Laan (D66) summarised that the 
key questions were whether ‘this constitution would make Europe more democratic and decisive’. 84 In 
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these meetings, Dutch politicians from both chambers made one point very clear across party lines: 
they all wished for proper democratic representation.
85
 Even MP Van Bommel (SP), although his party 
was highly sceptical about the draft Treaty, conceded: “On the one hand, we are in favour of a 
moratorium on the transfer of new policy powers from The Hague to Brussels; on the other hand we 
support proposals that will lead to a democratisation of decision making within the EU.” 86  
 
6.2 Subsidiarity testing as a competence for parliaments? 
Answering the second sub-question, on what government and parliament wished to solve by 
enhancing the role of national parliaments, MP Timmermans reported to the Dutch House of 
Representatives in September 2002 that the issue of subsidiarity was cited multiple times during the 
Convention. Academic literature suggests that the salience of the principle of subsidiarity usually 
increases during periods of institutional reform.
87
 This is confirmed by the distinct presence the 
concept warranted in these parliamentary discussions leading up to the draft Constitutional Treaty. It is 
no wonder that in the midst of institutional discussions, and the debate on the role of national 
parliaments in the EU, the principle of subsidiarity was a touchstone for designing new ways to add 
legitimacy to EU decision-making. Although both the role of national parliaments and of subsidiarity 
had been on the EU’s agenda for at least a decade, this was the first time that they were decisively 
linked to each other.
88
 Already during ‘Nice’, the HoR had already asked for an operationalisation of 
the principle, to expand the competence of the COSAC to comment on EU legislative proposals. MP 
Timmermans reported that the Convention was trying to make agreements on how to employ the 
principle of subsidiarity in a more practical manner, thus obligating EU institutions to take the 
possibility of a subsidiarity test more seriously. Timmermans said: “If national parliaments feel that 
certain issues do not fall within the competence of the European institutions, they must be able to 
report this, after which the Commission is obliged to argue why it has a different opinion.”89 Under 
influence of the Convention, Timmermans was arguing for a role for national parliaments to scrutinise 
subsidiarity more closely than they were doing, in order to give an operational interpretation of the 
principle.  
Additionally, MP Van de Beeten (CDA, Senate) proudly asserted that national parliaments 
would not be written into the treaty in a protocol, as had previously been the case, but that they would 
gain ‘a very independent position in which they are deemed and called upon to participate in European 
integration and European legislation’.90 Many factions, like CDA, VVD, SP and D66, were in favour 
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of even giving national parliaments the right to go to the European Court of Justice, if they felt that the 
principle of subsidiarity was not respected. This would effectively provide national parliaments with 
the option to give the Commission a ‘red card’. Ultimately, the government – in the person of state 
secretary for European Affairs Nicolaï (VVD) – pleaded that a ‘yellow card’ would be enough. He 
reasoned that the Commission would not dare resubmit a proposal that one-third of the national 
parliaments had already formed a coalition against. MP Timmermans (PvdA) agreed wholeheartedly 
with him, and added a red card would inevitably lead to a total paralysis of the decision-making 
procedure in the EU.
91 
The bottom-line of this debate was that even though the precise content of the mechanism was 
still under debate, both chambers were enthusiastic about the new role of national parliaments as 
proposed by the Convention. Moreover, even though the IGC was still to begin, a group of MPs from 
both chambers submitted a motion in which the chairs of the House and Senate were called upon to 
establish a Joint Temporary Committee Subsidiarity to make suggestions about the desired 
adjustments to the working of Dutch parliament, which was accepted.
92
 The Dutch House of 
Representatives and the Senate therefore established a Joint Temporary Committee Subsidiarity, to 
research what the role of national parliaments could be under the new treaty. The parliaments showed 
great willingness to change the normal procedures, as illustrated by breaking the precedent about joint-
parliamentary meetings in order to discuss the Convention’s draft treaty. Their willingness to innovate 
was also illustrated by the establishment of this joint committee, which was to design the way in which 
parliamentary scrutiny of proposed EU legislation would be undertaken by the Dutch parliamentary 
chambers, even before this competence was formally accepted into the draft Constitutional Treaty.  
The atmosphere in the Dutch House of Representatives was almost festive after the 
presentation of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Most MPs felt that all democratic processes were duly 
observed thanks to the success of the Convention. MP Van Dijk (CDA) stated that ‘under the treaties 
of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice there were always ‘leftovers’ […]. That is definitely not the case 
now.’93 In his eyes, all institutional issues that had been postponed in the Treaties of Amsterdam and 
Nice had now been adequately resolved. Additionally, MP Van Baalen (VVD) stated that the VVD 
was not altogether content, but that it was also not planning to vote against the draft Constitutional 
Treaty. He reasoned, reflecting the feeling of multiple other parties, that if they had accepted the Nice 
Treaty, they could accept this treaty. This one was better, so why vote against it?
94
 MP Timmermans 
(PvdA) even complimented the government on the draft Constitutional Treaty. “The rights of the 
European citizen vis-à-vis the European government are firmly anchored and democracy is increasing, 
both through increasing the role of the European Parliament and, in particular, through increasing the 
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role of national parliaments.”95 The feeling in this debate was definitely more positive than in debates 
about the treaties in the years prior. All that was left now, they felt, was to engage the Dutch public by 
means of a referendum.
96
 
 
In this chapter, the debate about the position of national parliaments in the EU developed mostly 
because of ‘usual suspects’ that were active as representatives of both chambers to the Convention. As 
stated above, the parliaments were concerned with establishing proper democratic representation. For 
the first time, parliamentarians were at the table in Brussels. As we saw above, the Dutch House of 
Representatives and the Senate took this opportunity very seriously, by organising these joint 
parliamentary meetings. The second sub-question of this thesis asks: what did government and 
parliament wish to solve by focusing on enhancing the role of national parliaments in the EU? We saw 
in previous chapters that this had shifted from a parliament demanding more control on their own 
government officials to wanting direct influence on EU legislation. The Convention was the summit of 
this last wish. The focus from both government and parliamentary representatives at the Convention 
on subsidiarity testing as a potential competence for national parliaments illustrates the 
intergovernmental position that the Dutch government and parliaments had gradually switched to. In 
the next chapter, the lead up to the Lisbon Treaty will be discussed, taking in account the aftermath of 
the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty by the Dutch people in the 2005 referendum. 
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Chapter 7: Leading up to Lisbon 
 
On 29 May and 1 June 2005, the French and Dutch peoples voted against the adoption of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty. To the generally pro-European political elite in the Netherlands, the outcome of 
the referendum was shocking.
97
 Before the referendum, most Dutch MPs had not even contemplated 
that the draft Constitutional Treaty might not be ratified. Nevertheless, the political parties opposed to 
the draft Constitutional Treaty, spearheaded by the SP, had campaigned very successfully. The amount 
of money paid annually to EU was a big concern, and the fear of losing ‘Dutch values’ was another.98 
Even Turkish accession to the EU was used as an argument against ratifying the draft Constitutional 
Treaty.
99
 However, as mentioned in the literature review, despite the emphasis of the ‘no’ campaign on 
a lack of ‘demos’ and thus of the possibility of a real democracy, voters did not cite this as the reason 
for voting against the Constitutional Treaty.
100
 After the French and Dutch rejections of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, the EU seemed to be in deep crisis.
101
 Dutch Prime Minister Jan-Peter 
Balkenende stressed that a period of contemplation was needed, and that EU integration had been ‘too 
much, too fast and too expensive’.102 
 
7.1 Aftermath of the referendum 
As mentioned in the beginning of this thesis, the Dutch government led by Jan-Peter Balkenende 
reasoned that citizens felt they had no influence on the pace or shape of EU integration. According to 
Balkenende, the people had tried to convey three messages to the government: “The fear of a loss of 
sovereignty, the fact that the pace of change was too high and that the Netherlands is paying too much 
to the EU.”103 The government took this signal to mean that they needed to have more visible 
influence in Brussels, preferably earlier in the decision-making process. Confirming this line of 
thought, Dutch secretary for European Affairs Nicolaï wrote to the Dutch House of Representatives in 
2006: “The referendum has demonstrated the importance of making the European decision-making 
process and the national role in this more transparent for citizens.”104 As we know from the earlier 
chapters of this thesis, this was not a new conclusion: already in the report by MP Van Baalen in 2002, 
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the Dutch House of Representatives was advised to aim for more pro-active parliamentary control.
105
 
Additionally, the Joint Committee Subsidiarity – mentioned in the previous chapter as established by 
the Dutch parliaments after the Convention’s success – had already advised the HoR twice about 
strengthening its role in the EU decision-making process. Many reports from many different advisory 
bodies had concluded, like the Van Baalen report and the Joint Committee, that the Dutch House of 
Representatives was doing ‘too little, too late’ about parliamentary control of EU affairs.106 Less than a 
year after the referendum, state secretary for European Affairs Nicolaï (VVD) stated: “The increased 
interest for the application of the principle of subsidiarity is largely the result of the referendum on the 
draft Constitutional Treaty.”107 The Dutch government clearly saw the solution in the role of national 
parliaments in scrutinizing proposed EU legislation for accordance with subsidiarity. Therefore, the 
Netherlands ultimately urged for more democratic control and visible debate. The Barroso 
Commission also adopted these priorities as part of ‘Plan D’, for more democracy, dialogue and 
debate.
108
 These were pillars for the following period of negotiating the new treaty, in order to make 
the public feel more included in EU affairs and decision-making. 
As argued in the literature review, it is clear that the solution that the Balkenende 
administration put to the problem of the rejected Constitutional Treaty does not fit, and that there must 
be other explanations for why the Dutch government focused on the role of national parliaments in the 
EU during the negotiations for ‘Lisbon’. One of the explanations that this thesis proposes will be put 
forth in the next paragraph: the simple fact that of the HoR already had all the institutional framework 
in place to make subsidiarity testing feasible, because the parliaments had been focused on this issue 
ever since they began to see their own role in a different light. The second explanation for the focus on 
national parliaments during the Lisbon negotiations is that the state secretary for Foreign Affairs of 
that time was former MP Frans Timmermans. Already during his time in the HoR, he was very vocal 
about the role of national parliaments. Additionally, he represented the parliament in the Convention, 
drafting the Constitutional Treaty. While the development of an idea is of course never a linear 
process, I would argue that the fact that Frans Timmermans was state secretary during the Lisbon 
negotiations has lifted this debate from the HoR to the governmental level. 
 
7.2 Dutch parliaments as trailblazers in subsidiarity 
Following the suggestions of its MPs in the joint debate on the Convention in 2003, the Dutch House 
of Representatives and Senate had installed a temporary Joint Committee Subsidiarity. This committee 
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had already in 2003 begun to research the possibility of a structured subsidiarity test and the best way 
to implement such a test, because the conclusions of the Convention and the negotiations of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty both pointed to the fact that national parliaments would gain the powers to 
perform a subsidiarity check. After the referendum and the failure of the draft Constitutional Treaty, 
however, this temporary Joint Committee did not stop its work. Both Dutch parliamentary chambers 
assumed that strengthening the role of national parliaments would also be a part of the next step in EU 
integration. This was assumed largely because the government stressed the importance of increasing 
visibility of decision-making to Dutch citizens, and national parliaments were simply more salient to 
Dutch voters than the European Parliament. Confirming this, State secretary Nicolaï wrote in a letter 
to the HoR that the government wished to ‘promote careful assessment of subsidiarity and 
proportionality of proposed EU legislation’, in the form of a subsidiarity check performed by national 
parliaments.
109
  
Following the advice of the temporary Joint Committee, parliament created an subsequent 
permanent Joint Committee Subsidiarity in April 2007.
110
 This committee designed a subsidiarity test 
for the Dutch parliamentary chambers, which entailed a detailed advice to the HoR and Senate about 
the precise specification of such a test and the results of a questionnaire that had been sent to the other 
EU national parliaments. The House also obligated the Dutch government to send explanatory notes 
on important dossiers earlier and initiated structural cooperation with other European parliaments.
111 
This new ‘Europe method’ additionally included designating administrative support especially to 
subsidiarity testing.
112
 
As we know from the introduction of this thesis, the Dutch government heavily prioritized the 
role of national parliaments as ‘subsidiarity checkers’ in the negotiations of this treaty. In the Dutch 
House of Representatives, however, the debate surrounding the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was 
dominated by the question which role the Dutch parliaments themselves should play in the EU, after 
approval of the new treaty.
113
 During the debate on the approval of the Lisbon Treaty in the Dutch 
House of Representatives in June 2008, two amendments were introduced that were vital in the 
discussion about the democratic deficit and the role of national parliaments.  
The first was almost a culmination of all preparatory work and advices on democracy that the 
Dutch House of Representatives had gathered in the previous years. In the amendment submitted by 
five MPs from the opposition
114
, a scrutiny reserve for Dutch officials in the Council was proposed. 
This scrutiny reserve meant that the government representative could not act or make a decision in the 
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Council, until both chambers finished scrutinizing the proposals. It would effectively make the Dutch 
House of Representatives as powerful over their government officials as the Danish parliament is over 
theirs. Eventually, after much debate, a compromise was reached on this amendment between the 
opposition in the House and State secretary Timmermans. Ultimately, the compromise meant that only 
proposals with ‘special political significance’ in parliament were subjected to a parliamentary scrutiny 
reserve in Brussels. The Dutch government would keep parliament duly up to date on these kinds of 
politically sensitive proposals, and after four weeks of scrutiny reservation, parliament and 
government would consult again.
115
 
Additionally, the Dutch government asked the HoR to vote for an adjustment: the consent 
requirement, installed after the Maastricht Treaty to help fill the democratic gap where co-decision 
was lacking, would be abolished. The reasoning behind this was that since the Lisbon Treaty granted 
almost full co-decision to the European Parliament, it would be overdoing it to also ask the national 
parliament to consent.
116
 Although not all MPs readily agreed to this, because it would still mean the 
loss of a tool for parliamentary control for the HoR, eventually the coalition parties sided with the 
government and the consent requirement was abolished in all cases where the European Parliament 
had co-decision powers.
117
 
Eventually the Lisbon Treaty was negotiated and ratified in 2007, and caused a significant 
increase in the powers of national parliaments.
118
 It has often been called ‘the Treaty of the 
Parliaments’, because the European Parliament gained influence, and the national parliaments were 
designated a more important role with the so-called ‘yellow card system’ – a procedure which had 
already been included in the draft Constitutional Treaty, and allowed national parliaments to force a 
review of draft EU legislation on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. It would also expand this 
oversight role by means of a stronger ‘orange card’ procedure, which in specific circumstances offered 
the chance to reject legislative proposals in their entirety. This procedure for the Dutch parliaments 
was in fact an institutionalisation of the already developed practice of subsidiarity testing by the HoR, 
and was thus relatively easy for the parliaments to transpose into practice. Although the Dutch House 
of Representatives lost a large portion of its consent powers for binding decisions in the Council, it 
gained a scrutiny reserve on issues of ‘particular political interest’ to parties.  
Conclusions 
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The conclusions to this thesis aim to explain why the Balkenende administration put their efforts into 
enhancing the role of national parliaments in the EU during the Lisbon negotiations, by illustrating 
how the debate about national parliaments in the EU developed in the Dutch House of Representatives 
and what the Dutch government and parliaments wished to solve exactly with their focus on national 
parliaments. The conclusions will first discuss chronologically how the debate in the HoR developed, 
as the first sub-question of this thesis, tracing back the engagement of the HoR with the role of 
national parliaments and subsidiarity from Maastricht to Lisbon. During the analysis of these 
developments, the first part of why Dutch government became focused on the role of national 
parliaments during the Lisbon negotiations will become clear. In the second part, the conclusions will 
present the main debate in the Dutch House of Representatives about the democratic deficit relating to 
national parliaments: what exactly had both government and parliament envisioned to solve? Lastly, 
the conclusions will discuss the implications of this thesis and recommendations for future research. 
 
Concerning the Dutch position on the role of national parliaments 
To build an explanation for the negotiating position of the Dutch parliament during ‘Lisbon’, this 
thesis traced the development of  the debate about the role of national parliaments in the HoR from 
Maastricht to Lisbon, as the first sub-question. In this paragraph follows a short summary of the most 
influential changes in this debate. 
During the Maastricht debates in the HoR, we saw that the parliament slowly started to shift 
from a very pro-integrationist to more intergovernmental position, because of a meagre reception of 
their quite federally oriented non-paper in 1991. This caused the parliament to be critical about their 
own role for the first time in the lead-up to the Amsterdam Treaty. The HoR had a relatively young 
EU affairs committee and had until then mostly been waiting for the European Parliament to gain 
momentum. We also saw that the government encouraged the parliament to debate the ratification of 
the Treaty more active, something that – the government was happy to see – the parliament indeed did 
for the Amsterdam Treaty. By amending the ratifying act of the Treaty of Maastricht to ensure that the 
government needed parliamentary consent for binding decision in the policy area of justice and home 
affairs, the HoR tried to balance the missing co-decision powers of the European Parliament. 
However, in practice this has largely resulted in the government more actively informing the HoR 
about negotiations in these areas. In itself, this was a positive development, but the parliament could 
have gained more from this mechanism. 
During the Amsterdam negotiations, Van Mierlo’s letter declared that several member states 
were pressing for an enhanced role of national parliaments in applying the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Dutch government, however, did not prioritise the role of national parliaments during the 
Amsterdam negotiations. On the one hand, because the Netherlands was chairing as well as 
negotiating, they were preserving a precarious balance between shrewd negotiator and the image of 
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honest presidency. On the other hand, there were simply more pressing matters on the table at the time 
and the Dutch government had set other priorities. Already after the Treaty of Amsterdam, national 
parliaments were supposed to receive information on new Commission proposals within six weeks, 
but in reality the information flow was still inconsistent and lacking. Additionally, the information still 
came only from the government, thus preserving the government’s information monopoly. The 
information flow seemed solved on paper, but it was in practice not yet sufficient to eliminate the 
imbalance. 
During the Nice negotiations in the years 2000-2001, it became apparent that the priority of 
the Dutch government was the functionality and efficiency of the EU, because of the pending 
enlargement, but not the role of national parliaments or increasing democracy. The HoR, by voice of 
the more federalist parties PvdA and D66, reminded the government multiple times that the 
democratic condition of the EU left something to be desired. Especially MPs Timmermans (PvdA) and 
Scheltema-De Nie (D66) were actively reminding the government of the potential role that national 
parliaments could play in solving the democratic deficit. Since Timmermans went on to become the 
responsible state secretary for European Affairs in the ‘Lisbon’ negotiations, there is a clear 
connection between his interest in the topic as a MP and as a state secretary and negotiator. After the 
Van Baalen report, the Permanent Representative of the Dutch parliament in Brussels was established 
to gain independence from government information. Additionally, the HoR became more aware of the 
impact of European legislation on domestic policy-making and legislation and wanted to increase its 
clout in decision-making on the European level, rather than focusing solely on the domestic level.  
During the Convention, the idea of national parliaments as the ‘guardians of subsidiarity’119 
really developed. In the international environment of the preparatory Convention meetings, and the 
subsequent COSAC discussions, the role of national parliaments was much discussed, and was 
eventually considered to be vital in solving the democratic legitimacy problem of the EU. The Dutch 
MPs adopted this idea, giving voice and body to their own debates about the issue. After the 
devastating ‘no’ vote of the 2005 referendum, however, optimism gave way to caution in the public 
debate, even though the permanent Joint Committee Subsidiarity was silently replaced the temporary 
Joint Committee Subsidiarity. The Dutch House of Representatives clearly believed that their efforts 
to create a subsidiarity check for national parliaments would not be in vain but that this Early Warning 
Mechanism would definitely be adopted into the next treaty. This efforts resulted in an extensive 
administrative preparation of subsidiarity scrutiny by 2006, which paved the way for the formal 
introduction of the mechanism in the Lisbon Treaty. 
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Concerning the dimensions of the democratic deficit 
MPs in the Dutch House of Representatives clearly felt that the democratic deficit was the result of the 
disparity between efficient majority voting in the Council and proper parliamentary oversight. Most 
Dutch MPs felt that decision-making in the Council should always be paired with parliamentary 
oversight, either by the European Parliament or by national parliaments. The discussion about 
democracy in the EU in the HoR was therefore essentially about the introduction of qualified majority 
voting in the Council, without proper parliamentary control from a corresponding parliamentary body: 
the European Parliament was not granted co-decision in each policy area where the Council was 
voting with a qualified majority. This created a democratic gap, wherein EU legislation was not 
formally supported by democratic representation. This is the ‘European dimension’ of the debate about 
democracy in the EU. 
Additionally, the transition to qualified majority voting in the Council meant that member 
states had to forfeit their veto powers on many issues, which – although making EU decision-making 
more efficient – created a democratic fallacy in their domestic structures of governance, because it 
made parliamentary oversight more difficult in national parliaments. The Dutch constitutional system 
is largely based on ministerial responsibility. However, the accountability of ministers in the Council 
was severely diminished because of the loss of veto powers in the Council.
120
 Government officials 
were harder to scrutinize, because of growing majority voting in the Council. It became easier for a 
government representative to ‘hide’ behind a majority: they could argue that they had nothing to do 
with a certain decision, because they had no veto power. Additionally, national parliaments were 
experiencing a lack of information, which made their job of scrutinizing their government’s position in 
the Council even harder. It made national parliaments dependent on their governments for 
information, which per definition hinders proper parliamentary control. Both the possibility to hide 
behind other member states due to the loss of veto powers, and the information deficit in national 
parliaments undermined the possibilities for parliamentary oversight, and thus widened the democratic 
gap. With each step of EU integration, it grew more difficult for national parliaments to question and 
control their government representatives in the European Council. This represents the ‘domestic 
dimension’ of the democracy debate. 
Above, I have identified two dimensions that characterize the debate in the Dutch House of 
Representatives about the EU’s democratic deficit after the Maastricht Treaty. On the EU level, the 
imbalance between majority decision-making in the Council and proper parliamentary oversight by 
means of co-decision in the European Parliament constitutes the European dimension of the 
democratic deficit. On the domestic level, a loss of veto power and a lack of information made it more 
difficult for the HoR to scrutinize the government’s position in the Council. Thus, there is a ‘European 
dimension’, in which MPs wished to adjust decision-making to restore the right balance of powers so 
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that citizens would be more directly represented in EU decision-making. Secondly, there was a 
‘domestic dimension’, in which the HoR wished for sufficient information and a different position in 
the EU legislative process to ensure that they can hold their governments accountable. These two 
dimensions, the ‘European dimension’ and the ‘domestic dimension’ constitute the democratic deficit 
in the eyes of the Dutch House of Representatives. Thus it answers the second sub-question of the 
thesis, by clarifying that the Dutch House of Representatives and the Dutch government shifted their 
aim from wanting to resolve the ‘domestic dimension’, to a larger focus on the ‘European dimension’ 
of the democratic deficit. They tried to do so by balancing the European Parliament’s democratic 
mandate by creating a similar mandate for national parliaments on the EU level, through subsidiarity 
scrutiny. Whether this was successful is for future research to establish.  
 
Implications and recommendations 
This thesis contributed to the academic debate about the democratic deficit, by discerning the two 
dimensions of the democratic deficit that the Dutch government and parliament wished to solve. When 
taking these two different dimensions into account when explaining the position of the Balkenende 
administration during the Lisbon negotiations, the intergovernmental position of the Dutch 
government is clear. Two underlying reasons for this negotiating position are the presence of the right 
institutional structure in the HoR to focus on subsidiarity testing for national parliaments, and the 
strong voice of one of the earliest defenders of national parliaments in the Dutch parliament, Frans 
Timmermans. The position was thus partly deviated from a changing perspective on European 
integration. A parallel can be drawn between the quick change from a federalist to an 
intergovernmental stance in 1992, because of the shock of the bad reception of the Dutch non-paper in 
1991, and the switch the Dutch parliament and government made in their view on the Constitutional 
Treaty after the negative referendum result in 2005. 
It can be argued that more direct influence on EU legislative processes is the way forward, in 
an ever-closer Union. As mentioned in the literature review, there is a growing group among 
academics that hold the view that the Danish system – once a beacon of parliamentary control over 
their government officials – is not as effective as it used to be, because of the way EU decision-
making has changed. In that case, the Dutch parliament – as early adapters of this idea – might provide 
an example for national parliaments across the EU, especially to the Scandinavian parliaments. Since 
they, as mentioned in the literature review of this thesis, have been most focused on controlling 
government officials, having ‘given up’ on direct influence in the EU. 
Ultimately, with regards to the question why the Dutch government bet on subsidiarity 
scrutiny in the Lisbon negotiations, following the conclusions above the reasons for this are twofold. 
In the first place, the administrative set-up was already in place thanks to the proactive attitude of the 
HoR and Senate. The organization of a joint parliamentary meeting about the negotiations in the 
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Convention, and the subsequent establishment of the Joint Committees Subsidiarity, gave way to a 
concerted effort to create a functional subsidiarity check. Secondly, one of the main champions of the 
subsidiarity test and of a larger role for national parliaments in the HoR was Frans Timmermans, then 
Member of Parliament for the PvdA – later State secretary of Foreign Affairs under the first 
Balkenende cabinet. He was the representative MP to the Convention in 2002-2003, and he was very 
active in the parliamentary debates on the topic in the following years. He was also in favour of a 
referendum on the draft Constitutional Treaty, because he felt it was important to keep citizens on 
board and represent their wishes in the new European treaty. It makes sense, then, that he maintained 
these views when he took office as State Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 2007. His portfolio included 
the negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon and therefore he was prominent in these negotiations. 
Further research could be executed about how this same debate developed in other national 
parliaments in the EU, to put the findings of this research in an international perspective, allowing 
more insight in the development and agency of the role of national parliaments in the EU.  
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